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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF HEIRS
AND DISTRIBUTEES-WHETHER REVOCABLE TRUST OF PERSONALTY
CREATED BY HUSBAND DEFEATS WIDOW'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO SHARE
IN HIs ESTATE OR IS A CONVEYANCE IN FRAUD OF SUCH RIGHT-The
case of Smith v. Northern Trust Company' involved a suit by the
widow of the settlor of a revocable trust of personal property to
have the trust subjected to her statutory interest in the decedent's
estate. The facts indicate that the settlor, subsequent to his mar-
riage to the plaintiff, placed practically all of his estate, consisting
of personalty, in trust for himself for life with remainder to his
children by a prior marriage and to the plaintiff. He reserved the
right to revoke, alter, or amend the agreement in whole or in part.
In 1940, while temporarily estranged from plaintiff, he exercised
such right and eliminated the plaintiff as beneficiary without her
knowledge of that fact. Although reconciliation occurred, the terms
of the trust agreement were not revised. Upon settlor's death, the
1322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N. E. (2d) 75 (1944).
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assets of his estate, except for the property in trust, proved to be
negligible in amount, hence the widow's action. The trial court sus-
tained objections to the master's report, which had deemed the
amendment of the trust agreement to be a fraud on the widow's
rights, and dismissed the suit. Upon appeal, that decision was re-
versed and the cause remanded upon the ground that the transfer
of title to the trustee, although absolute in form, was colorable and
illusory because of the power of the settlor to revoke, and as a con-
sequence the same could not operate to defeat the widow's statutory
interest in her deceased husband's estate.
The holding in the instant case, although upon a set of facts
novel to this state, is in keeping with earlier Illinois decisions in-
volving slightly different factual situations but similar issues,2 as
well as with the general rule followed by other American courts.
Such rule may be stated to be that a husband may make a gift inter
vivos of his entire property if he wishes, provided the same be abso-
lute and bona fide, and such gift will not be a fraud on the rights
of the wife to share in her husband's property after his death. But
if the gift is merely colorable, i.e. is apparently a gift but in reality
amounts to a device by which he attempts to use and enjoy his
property during his lifetime while, at the same time, seeking to
deprive his wife of her property rights after his death, then such
transfer is deemed to be a legal fraud on the wife's rights, hence
voidable at her election.3
When concluding to approve and adopt such rule as applied to
transfers in trust, the Illinois court first examined the findings of
courts of other jurisdictions and then buttressed its decision by
reference to a New York case which involved the same factual situa-
tion and in which the question was resolved in favor of the widow.4
No attempt was made, however, to rationalize the failure to agree
with the holding of the Pennsylvania court in the case of Beirne v.
Continental-Equitable Trust Company,5 which decision is directly
contrary to the New York case as well as the instant one. The court
there held that a widow could not share in a trust estate created
by her husband even though the trust agreement provided that he
2 Geiger v. Merle, 360 Ill. 497, 196 N. E. 497 (1935); Blankenship v. Hall,
233 1ll. 116, 84 N. E. 192, 122 Am. St. Rep. 149 (1908); Padfield v. Padfield,
78 Ill. 16 (1875); Blodgett v. Blodgett, 266 Ill. App. 517 (1932); Delta & Pine
Land Co. v. Benton, 171 Ill. App. 635 (1912).
3West v. Miller, 78 F. (2d) 479 (1935); Burton v. Burton, 100 Colo. 567, 69
P. (2d) 307 (1937); Trader v. Trader, 48 Ida. 722, 285 P. 678 (1930); Geiger v.
Merle, 360 Ill. 497, 196 N. E. 497 (1935); Kratli v. Booth, 99 Ind. App. 178, 191
N. E. 180 (1934); Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S. W. (2d) 2 (1930); Levin
v. Levin, 166 Md. 451, 171 A. 77 (1934); In re Side's Estate, 119 Neb. 314, 228
N. W. 619 (1930); LeStrange v. LeStrange, 273 N. Y. S. 21, 242 App. Div. 74
(1934); Armstrong v. Connelly, 299 Pa. 51, 149 A. 87 (1930). See also 26 Am. Jur.,
Husband and Wife, §198, p. 816; 13 R. C. L. Husband and Wife, §§110-2, pp.
1085-9; 30 C. J., Husband and Wife, p. 523; 112 A. L. R. 649; 64 A. L. R. 467.
'Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966 (1937).
5 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 721 (1932).
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was to have the income for life and could revoke, alter or amend
the trust agreement at will. Evidence which tended to prove that
the trust there concerned had been created for the express purpose
of defeating the wife's right to share in the husband's estate after
his death was nullified when the court found that the plaintiff had
failed to prove an intention on the part of the husband to commit
an actual fraud. The majority view, therefore, seems to be satisfied
by a presumption of fraud rather than to require actual proof
thereof.
Whether such a presumption should be sufficient in cases of this
nature is essentially a question of public policy. That policy would
seem to be indicated in statutory provisions for the wife's partici-
pation in the personal property belonging to her deceased husband's
estate,6 which, like those concerning her dower right in his realty,
have been enacted to provide for her support after his death. As
the same reason no doubt underlies the existence of similar statutory
provisions in other states, it would seem that the view of the instant
case and those like it is more in keeping with legislative intent than
is the narrower view of the Pennsylvania court.
The right of the legally competent owner of property to dispose
of the same as he pleases, even to the point of impoverishing him-
self and his family if such is his wish, cannot, however, be denied.
As a consequence, it has been generally held that an absolute bona
fide gift of personalty by a husband during his lifetime is not a
fraud on the right of the wife to share in his estate at his death,
even though made with the intention and purpose of depriving her
of that right.' Even the reservation of a life interest to the husband
and some degree of control over the property will not defeat the
transfer if it is otherwise absolute in nature. 8 So, where the husband
created an irrevocable trust reserving the income for life, a federal
court has held that his widow has no interest in the trust estate.9
But when the facts indicate that the husband has it within his power
to revest the property in himself, the general rule is applied and
the widow can assert her statutory rights in the property involved.' 0
Attempts to defeat the widow's claim to a share in her husband's
estate through the medium of testamentary devises have uniformly
been held ineffectual for courts will not permit that to be done by
indirection which cannot be done directly. Statutory provisions per-
6Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §§162, 168, and 170.
. Sturges v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378 (1927); Redman v.
Churchill, 230 Mass. 415, 119 N. E. 953 (1918); Potter Title & Trust Co. v.
Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144 A. 401, 64 A. L. R. 463 (1928).
s Jones v. Somerville, 78 Miss. 269, 28 So. 940, 84 Am. St. Rep. 627 (1900);
Gentry v. Bailey, 6 Gratt. (Va.) 594 (1850).
9West v. Miller, 78 F. (2d) 479 (1935).
to Blodgett v. Blodgett, 266 Ill. App. 517 (1932); Brownell v. Briggs, 173
Mass. 529, 54 N. E. 251 (1899).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
mitting renunciation 1 provide adequate protection against limiting
the widow's share except with her consent.' 2
Moreover, courts confronted with the question of the effect to be
given to gifts cetusa mortis have consistently held that such gifts are
void insofar as the widow's claim is concerned.1 A somewhat simi-
lar problem is presented where the husband makes a gift to a third
person in order to avoid the payment of alimony or maintenance
which might be ordered against him in a suit commenced, or about
to be commenced, by the wife. Such transfers have likewise been
generally held to be a fraud on the wife and revocable at her insist-
ence.14
In the light thereof, the decision in the instant case would seem
commendable, not only because consistent with prevailing legal rea-
soning and in conformity with cases presenting analogous issues,
but also because it effectuates a clearly evidenced public policy favor-
ing the support of the widow from her deceased husband's estate.
If he desires to make that support a matter of public charge, he can
do so only at the risk of making himself a pauper also.
C. F. MARQUIS
DIVORCE--OPERATION AND EFFECT OF DIVORCE-WHETHER ONE
STATE MAY REFUSE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE FOREIGN DIVORCE
DECREE OF A SISTER STATE WHERE IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THE DOMI-
CILE OF THE PLAINTIFF SECURING SUCH DIVORCE WAS NOT BONA FIDE
-The question as to how far a foreign divorce decree is binding upon
a sister state under the full faith and credit clause of the federal
constitution,' has received attention through the recent Illinois Su-
preme Court decision in the case of Atkins v. Atkins.2 The facts
therein show that the parties were residents of Illinois prior to and
after their marriage; that the husband left his wife in 1940; that
the wife started suit for separate maintenance, in Illinois, 'site of
- Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §,§168-9.
12 Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 P. 128, 34 L. R. A. 49, 55 Am. St. Rep.
142 (1896); Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. 116, 84 N. E. 192, 122 Am. St. Rep.
149 (1908); Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606 (1895).
'3 Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 29 S. W. 641, 27 L. R. A. 507 (1895); Delta
& Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 Ill. App 635 (1912); Crawfordsville Trust Co.
v. Ramsey, 55 Ind. App. 40, 100 N. E. 1049, rehearing denied 102 N. E. 282
(1913); Manikee v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20, 2 S. W. 545 (1887); Smith v. Corey, 125
Minn. 190, 145 N. W. 1067 (1914); Dunn v. German-American Bank, 109 Mo.
90, 18 S. W. 1139 (1892); Huber's Estate, 25 Pa. Co. Ct. 373 (1901).
14 Turner v. Turner, 44 Ala. 437 (1870); Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266, 47
P. 37, 37 L. R. A. 626, 56 Am. St. Rep. 97 (1896); Ruffenach v. Ruffenach, 13
Colo. App. 102, 56 P. 812 (1899); Tyler v. Tyler, 126 Ill. 525, 21 N. E. 616, 9
Am. St. Rep. 642 (1888); Small v. Small, 56 Kan. 1, 42 P. 323, 30 L. R. A.
243, 54 Am. St. Rep. 581 (1895); Feigley v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537, 61 Am. Dec.
375 (1855); Doane v. Doane, 238 Mass. 106, 130 N. E. 484 (1921); Hayes v.
Lindquist, 22 Ohio App. 58, 153 N. E. 269 (1926); Griffith v. Griffith, 74 Or.
225, 145 P. 270 (1915); Bouslough v. Bouslough, 68 Pa. St. 495 (1871) , Green
v. Seaver, 59 Vt. 602, 10 A. 742 (1887).
1 U. S. Const., Art. IV, §1.
2386 Ill. 345, 54 N. E. (2d) 488 (1944).
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the matrimonial domicile, in 1941; that five days afterward the hus-
band commenced a suit for divorce in Nevada, and that he obtained
a decree there on substituted service in late 1941. In the meantime,
the husband had entered a special appearance in his wife's action
in Illinois limited to contesting the award for support as he had not
been personally served, so the wife amended her complaint to an
action in rem against his real property. The husband, having re-
ceived his Nevada decree by this time, defended such amended suit
on the ground that his obligation to furnish support had been termi-
nated by a valid divorce decree which was entitled to full faith and
credit in Illinois. The trial court sustained the wife's motion to
strike such defense after hearing evidence on the question as to the
husband's domicile in Nevada and granted a decree of separate
maintenance. When taking jurisdiction on direct appeal,3 the Illinois
Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the case did not coincide
with the problem in Williams v. North Carolina,4 and it affirmed the
trial court decision by deciding that a decree of divorce entered in
a sister state upon constructive service is not valid if the spouse
obtaining the divorce was not possessed of a bona fide domicile
within the jurisdiction of the court granting the decree.
That same problem had been presented only recently to an Illinois
Appellate Court in the case of Stephens v. Stephens,5 but it had been
there held that a divorce decree granted by a sister state possessing
prima facie evidence of validity had to be given full faith and credit
in Illinois so that further inquiry was precluded. A dissenting opin-
ion therein, however, had reasoned that if one spouse sets up a
domicile in a sister state which is "fictitious, fraudulent and falsely
alleged for the purpose of securing a divorce," 1 the validity of the
decree of divorce might be challenged in the courts of other states
who would be free to conduct an independent investigation into the
jurisdictional facts alleged to support such decree. The majority of
that court seemingly fell into the error of concluding that the deci-
sion in the Williams case made it obligatory upon them to give full
faith and credit to the foreign decree. The Illinois Supreme Court
fell into no such error, and the weight of decided cases in other
states is to the same effect.
7
The rule has often been stated that "the residence of a plaintiff
in a state or country that will confer jurisdiction to render a decree
of divorce which will be recognized elsewhere must be actual, bona
s Permitted, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §199, because a question in-
volving a construction of the constitution was deemed properly presented.
4 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273 (1942), noted
in 7 Md. L. Rev. 29, 31 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 18 Ind. L. J. 165, 41 Mich. L.
Rev. 1013, 15 Miss. L. J. 165, 17 St. John's Rev. 87, and 52 Yale L. J. 341.
5 319 Ill. App. 292, 49 N. E. (2d) 560 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 77, 32 Ill. B. J. 275.
a 319 Ill. App. 292 at 298, 49 N. E. (2d) 560 at 562.
7 See cases noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 77, particularly
notes 4 and 5.
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fide, and intended to be permanent or indefinite; and, according to
the weight of authority, it must be continued for the length of time
required by law." s There are, however, very few United States
Supreme Court decisions touching upon the validity of foreign di-
vorce decrees, so it may be worthwhile to examine the most impor-
tant ones. In Cheever v. Wilson,9 it was held that a divorce decree
based upon the domicile of the plaintiff plus in personam jurisdic-
tion over the defendant must be given full faith and credit in all the
other states. Bell v. Bell "I held that no state could give a divorce
decree the right to extrastate recognition under the full faith and
credit clause if it were not the state of domicile of at least one of
the spouses. In two other cases,11 it was held that a divorce decree
rendered in the state of the last matrimonial domicile, in favor of
a spouse still domiciled there, was entitled to full faith and credit
even though the other spouse was served by publication. But the
decision in Haddock v. Haddock,12 to the effect that one state cannot
sever marital ties where only one spouse is domiciled there if such
state was not the state of the matrimonial domicile, left the question
open to each individual state to decide whether such a foreign decree
was valid as to its own residents. In the latest case, that of Williams
v. North Carolina" it was decided that where a court of one state,
acting in accord with the requirements of procedural. due process,
granted a decree of divorce to a plaintiff domiciled within its juris-
diction, even though the defendant was not subject to the personal
jurisdiction of that court but was merely served constructively,
such decree was entitled to full faith and credit in all the states.
Although that case overruled the effect of the rule in the Haddock
case, the question as to whether the domicile was bona fide or not
was not raised therein nor was any answer made as to that point.
The question of vital concern in the instant case was definitely left
undecided.
It would, therefore, seem that if one state wishes to. reject a
divorce decree of a sister state, such action may rest on one of two
grounds, to-wit: lack of procedural due process, or lack of a bona
fide domicile by the party initiating the divorce action. On the latter
point, it has been held in Nevada, whose divorce decrees have most
often been denied full faith and credit, that a mere corporeal pres-
ence in the-county in which the divorce proceeding is brought is not
sufficient to establish either residence or domicile.1 4 In much the
a 27 C. J. S. Divorce, §332, and cases there noted.
976 U. S. (9 Wall.) 108, 19 L. Ed. 604 (1870).
10 181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551, 45 L. Ed. 804 (1901).
11 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794 (1901);
Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, 33 S. Ct. 129, 57 L. Ed. 347 (1913).
12 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1 (1906).
13 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273 (1942).
14 Latterner v. Latterner, 51 Nev. 285, 274 P. 194 (1929). See also Walker v.
Walker, 45 Nev. 105, 198 P. 433 (1921), and Fleming v. Fleming, 36 Nev. 135,
134 P. 445 (1913).
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same way, the act of leaving one's domicile and going into another
state for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce with the intention
of immediately returning is insufficient to effect a change of domi-
cile. 15 For that matter Pennsylvania has declared that its residents
cannot set up domicile in one state solely for the purpose of getting
a divorce, even though intending to remarry immediately and there-
after set up a genuine domicile in some other state, and expect to
have such divorce decree recognized in Pennsylvania under the full
faith and credit clause.0 So too, in New York, either party to the
foreign divorce decree may attack it as void in an action to settle
matrimonial status 17 unless estopped by laches, 18 even though it is
no part of the public policy of that state to refuse recognition to
foreign decrees if rendered on the appearance of both parties despite
the fact that they have gone out of the state to obtain a decree on
grounds which would not be regarded as sufficient in New York.19 A
brief sojourn in another state, leading to a default divorce decree,
will not suffice though for slight additional evidence that there was
no intention of remaining indefinitely will result in disregard of
such decree.20 Want of jurisdiction over the person or subject matter
being always open to inquiry, 21 the recital of jurisdictional facts in
the foreign decree may be questioned collaterally as is also the case
where fraud was perpetrated on the foreign court.
22
It appears rather certain, then, in the light of these established
decisions, that no state will be compelled to give full faith and
credit to the divorce decree of a sister state obtained by a spouse
who is not a bona fide resident thereof when that question is raised
by the other spouse, provided the court rendering the decree did not
have personal jurisdiction over both parties. The question as to
what should constitute a bona fide domicile for purpose of divorce
jurisdiction may some day be settled by the United States Supreme
Court, but in the meantime it would seem as though the state
courts have arrived at a logical answer.
H. H. FLENTYE
15 State v. Williams, 224 N. Car. 183, 29 S. E. (2d) 744 (1944). See also
Wilkes v. Wilkes, 16 So. (2d) 15 (Ala.) (1943).
16 Melnick v. Melnick, 154 Pa. Super. 481, 36 A. (2d) 235 (1944).
17 Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 47 N. E. (2d) 423 (1943).
is In re Adam's Estate, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 494 (1943); Finan v. Finan, 47
N. Y. S. (2d) 429 (1944).
- Graham v. Hunter, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 717, 266 App. Div. 576 (1943).
20 Forster v. Forster, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 320 (1944).
21 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278, 132 A. L. R.
1357 (1941).
22 Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217, 28 Am. Rep. 129 (1878). The court,. in the
Atkins case, found further ground for denying full faith and credit to the
Nevada decree in the fact that the husband had practiced fraud on the Nevada
court by withholding information relative to the earlier proceeding for separate
maintenance in the court of Illinois.
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF
CLAIMS-WHETHER HEIR AT LAW WHO IS GIVEN SMALL LEGACY UN-
DER WILL IS AN "AGGRIEVED PERSON" WITHIN MEANING OF STATUTE
PERMITTING APPEAL FROM ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE--
The facts in the recent case of In re Everty's Estate I disclosed that
the testatrix left a substantial estate consisting of real and personal
property. Before the will was admitted to probate, the executor
therein named filed a claim against the estate for legal services per-
formed for the testatrix before her death, which claim was allowed
subsequent to probate. At the hearing on such claim, the estate
was represented by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. A
legatee under the will, who was also an heir at law, thereafter ap-
pealed from the allowance of such claim but was met by a motion
to dismiss the appeal on the theory that he was not an "aggrieved
person" within the meaning of the statute permitting appeal. 2 Such
contention was upheld by the circuit court, but the Appellate Court
for the Third District reversed on the theory that as appellant was
an heir at law, still had the right to bring proceedings to contest
the will,3 and had not evidenced any election not to file such contest,
he was to be regarded as an aggrieved person within the meaning
of the statute in question.'
The statute involved grants the right of appeal to "any person
who considers himself aggrieved" and does not limit that right to
one who is a party to the record.5 If literal application were given
to such language, the doors of the appellate tribunal would be wide
open for anyone might consider himself aggrieved no matter how
foreign his concern to the matter at hand. An appeal by a party
who has no actual grievance, however, will be dismissed," so it is
necessary to define the word "aggrieved" in order to determine when
an appealable interest exists.
That word has been defined to refer to a substantial grievance
such as the denial of some personal or property right, either legal
1 322 Ill. App. 363, 54 N. E. (2d) 627 (1944).
2l. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §484. The motion alleged that as his legacy
amounted to only $166.67 and the gross personal estate was more than ample to
cover all legacies, expenses, claims, and taxes, he could in no way be injured
by the allowance of the claim, particularly since he had filed no action to con-
test the will and had no right to renounce its provisions.
3 11. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §242, provides that suit to contest a will may be
filed within nine months after probate. That period had not elapsed, in the
instant case, when the appeal was taken. Appellant's right to bring such pro-
ceeding, as an heir at law, was unquestioned: Pfirshing v. Falsh, 87 Ill. 260
(1877).
4 The court found it unnecessary to discuss or pass upon the question of
whether or not appellant, as a beneficiary under the will, would have had the
right to appeal.
,5Weer v. Gand, 88 Ill. 490 (1878); Pfirshing v. Falsh, 87 Ill. 260 (1877);
Mundy v. Mundy, 230 Ill. App. 266 (1923); Collins v. Kinnare, 89 Ill. App. 236
(1899); Wood v. Johnson, 13 Ill. App. 548 (1883); Schneider v. Eldredge, 125
F. 638 (1903).
6 Wallace v. Chicago & Erie Stove Co., 46 1l1. App. 571 (1892).
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or equitable, or the imposition upon the party of a burden or obliga-
tion. It follows, therefore, that a person may consider himself ag-
grieved within the meaning of the statute only when the judgment,
order, or decree operates prejudicially and directly upon his prop-
erty, his pecuniary interests, or upon his personal rights.7 He need
not be a party to the record, for it is enough that his interests are
affected and that he would derive some substantial benefit from the
modification or reversal of the judgment in question." On motion
to dismiss his appeal, therefore, the question is not whether the
appellant is entitled to a reversal on the merits but rather whether
the record discloses that some substantial right of his appears to
have been affected by the order.
There does not appear to be any other case, either in Illinois or
elsewhere, directly in point but appealable interests have been found
to exist, for example, in case two wills of different dates are pre-
sented for probate and the earlier will is denied probate because of
the existence of the later one. The chief beneficiary of the earlier
will has such a substantial interest as would enable him to maintain
proceedings to set aside the later will," hence it would seem that he
should be in a position to appeal from the order of probate. Like-
wise, on appeal from the admission of a disputed will to probate, a
brother of the testator and one of his heirs at law has been held
to be an interested person within contemplation of the statute.10
But no such appealable interest has been found in favor of a nephew
of the testator who was not the next of kin nor mentioned in the
will as he was treated as having no existing pecuniary interest such
as would entitle him to appeal from the probate thereof.1 In much
the same way, a creditor was denied the right to appeal when he
had not yet filed any claim as such creditor, for it did not appear
that he would be a party aggrieved. 12 For that matter, a beneficiary
named in the will has been deemed not injuriously affected by a
decree confirming a devise to another person and as a consequence
has been barred from complaining of such decree. 3
When, however, it is remembered that it has been frequently
held that an heir may appeal from allowance of a claim against an
7 Weer v. Gand, 88 1ll. 490 (1878); In re Estate of Hills, 305 Ill. App. 193,
27 N. E. (2d) 324 (1940); Wood v. Johnson, 13 Ill. App. 548 (1883); In re
Michigan-Ohio Bldg. Corp., 117 F. (2d) 191 (1941); Greene v. Willis, 47 R. I
251, 132 A. 545 (1926), rehearing denied 47 R. I. 375, 133 A. 651 (1926). See
also 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, §183.
s See cases in note 5 ante, and Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., "Aggrieved
Party," Vol. 1, p. 273 et seq.
9 Adams v. First M. E. Church, 251 Ill. 268, 96 N. E. 253 (1911).
10 Barber v. Barber, 368 Ill. 215, 13 N. E. (2d) 257 (1938).
1" Glos v. Glos, 341 Ill. 447, 173 N. E. 604, 72 A. L. R. 1328 (1930), affirming
255 Ill. App. 567 (1929).
12 Wallace v. Chicago & Erie Stove Co., 46 Ill. App. 571 (1892).
1" Decker v. Decker, 121 Ill. 341, 12 N. E. 750 (1887).
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intestate estate,14 it would seem that the instant case follows in the
path of established law. As heir at law, appellant had a statutory
right to file a complaint to contest the will. Since such right had
not been waived or barred, he might eventually succeed in over-
throwing the will. If that occurred, he would have a clear right to
contest any claim filed and allowed against the estate provided he
exercised such right in apt time. His rights ought not to be preju-
diced by premature action by executor and creditor, but if denied
the opportunity to appeal, such would be the result.
RUTH MARKMAN
LANDLORD AND TENANT-RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
BY LANDLORD-WHETHER OR NOT TENANT, TO DEFEAT ACTION FOR
POSSESSION, MAY SHOW THAT HIS LANDLORD HAS BEEN DIVESTED OF
TITLE BY TAx DEED--A case of first impression, involving an attempt
to assert an estoppel by lease where the subsequent conveyance of
the lessor's title was by a tax deed, has reached the Illinois Appel-
late Court in the recent case of Beach v. Boettcher.1 The facts
therein show that the defendant-lessee entered into a lease with the
plaintiff-lessor for a term of nine months. At the expiration of the
term, defendant continued to occupy the premises on a month to
month basis. No duty was imposed on defendant by the lease to
pay the taxes assessed against the premises, but the lessor failed
in that regard and the property was sold for delinquent taxes. The
purchaser eventually received a tax deed inasmuch as no redemp-
tion was made from the tax sale. Thereafter, the lessor brought an
action of forcible entry and detainer and secured judgment for pos-
session in the trial court when that tribunal decided that defend-
ant's claim that the lessor's title had been divested by virtue of the
issuance of the tax deed was not a good defense. The Appellate
Court reversed such judgment on appeal on the ground that the
tenant was not estopped to show that his lessor's title had been
divested by the tax deed.2
To support the judgment in his favor, plaintiff relied mainly
upon the rule of law that a tenant is estopped to deny the title of
his landlord. Such rule, though given wider application today, pos-
sessed a much more limited meaning under the common law for the
14 Motsinger v. Coleman, 16 Ill. 71 (1854); Blood v. Harvey, 81 Ill. App. 187
(1898); In re Osbon's Estate, 179 Minn. 133, 228 N. W. 551 (1930).
1 323 Ill. App. 79, 55 N. E. (2d) 104 (1944). The judgment was reversed and
remanded with directions to permit the lessee to deposit the rent reserved with
the clerk of the court so as to protect himself from double liability. Presumably,
distribution of the fund was to await the outcome of proceedings between lessor
and holder of tax title to settle the right thereto.
2 The court intimated that the cause of action, if one existed, would be vested
in the grantee under the tax deed, or his transferees, by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat.
1943, Ch. 80, §14, which provides that the grantees of demised lands "shall have
the same remedies . . . as their grantor or lessor might have had if such rever-
sion had remained in such lessor or grantor."
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tenant there was not estopped to deny his landlord's title unless
the lease took the form of an indenture under seal signed by both
parties. For that reason, neither a lease in the form of a deed poll
signed only by the landlord, nor enjoyment of the estate under it,
would operate to prevent the tenant from disputing the lessor's
title.3 Any estoppel which there arose was not due to any general
rule of law but because the tenant, by his own deed under seal, had
conclusively admitted the lessor's title. It was the effect of the seal
rather than the lease or the relation of landlord and tenant which
gave rise to the doctrine and, as a consequence, the estoppel lasted
only during the term stated in the indenture. After the expiration
of the lease, even though the tenant still continued to occupy, he
could set up a pre-existing title even in himself.4
In more modern times, the doctrine of estoppel has been ex-
tended until it is now recognized as existing independently of the
form or nature of the lease and whether the same be sealed or
unsealed, written or oral. It now takes the form of an estoppel in
pais rather than by deed and is based on permissive possession.
Such estoppel will endure so long as the permissive possession con-
tinues, whether the original term of hiring has or has not expired.
For that reason, it is the tenant's duty to surrender possession to
his landlord and, until-he discharges- that duty or is legally excused
from it, he will not be permitted to claim title in himself. That
doctrine, however, does not prevent the tenant from showing that
the lessor's title has expired since the possession commenced, either
by its own limitation,5 by the act of the lessor,6 or through eviction
by title paramount,7 for the theory underlying such claim does not
deny the landlord's title but admits it for the purpose of proving
that it now no longer exists. 8
No Illinois case to date, prior to the instant one, has considered
whether a fully completed tax sale of the lessor's title will operate
as a subsequent destruction of the landlord's interest so as to permit
the tenant to raise that question. The two cases cited by the Appel-
late Court, tending to support its decision and the holding that a
tenant may show that his landlord's title has been divested in that
a See Co. Litt. 47b and also Palmer v. Ekins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1550, 92 Eng. Rep.
505 (1725).
4 Page v. Kinsman, 43 N. H. 328 (1861).
5 Tilghman & West v. Little, 13 Ill. 240 (1851); Franklin v. Palmer, 50 Ill. 202
(1869).
e St. John v. Quitzow, 72 Ill. 334 (1874).
7 Corrigan v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N. E. 746 (1893); Franklin v.
Palmer, 50 Ill. 202 (1869).
s Wells v. Mason, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 84 (1842); Tilghman & West v. Little, 13 Ill.
239 (1851); Lowe v. Emerson, 48 Ill. 160 (1868); Franklin v. Palmer, 50 Ill. 202
(1869); St. John v. Quitzow, 72 Ill. 334 (1874); Hardin v, Forsythe, 99 Ill. 312
(1880); Gable v. Wetherholt, 116 Ill. 313, 6 N. E. 453 (1886); Corrigan v. City of
Chicago, 144 ll. 537, 33 N. E. 746 (1893); Spafford v. Hedges, 231 Ill. 140, 83
N. E. 129 (1907); Mltzlaff v. Midland Lumber Co., 338 Ill. 575, 170 N. E. 695
(1930).
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fashion, arose in Michigan 9 and Maryland. 0 Under the Michigan
statute relating to the sale of land for non-payment of taxes, the
tax deed conveys an absolute title and the holder may commence
suit to quiet title without taking possession of the premises." By
judicial decision in that state, it has been held that the effect of a
tax sale is to divest the former owner of his title thereto,1 2 and the
tax sale, if legal, takes precedence over all other titles.1 The Mary-
land statute possesses a similar import."
A comparison between the provisions of the Michigan and Mary-
land statutes on the one hand with that of Illinois on the other 15
demonstrates that a tax deed issued by either of the former possesses
far greater importance than one issued here. It has been aptly
remarked that the vulnerable nature of titles arising in Illinois from
tax lien, sale, and deed has been "solely the handiwork of the courts.
In order to favor the 'owners' of property the doctrine of caveat
emptor has been carried to such severe extremes that a tax title is
little more than a nullity as against such 'owner.' Theoretically the
tax deed purports to be a conveyance of the fee title to the land.
But at an early date the Illinois Court put the tax deed in a special
class." "- In this state it is given more nearly the force and effect
of a lien upon the land for money advanced rather than that of a
valid conveyance of the property for the numerous and complex
provisions of our statute authorizing tax sales have been classed as
jurisdictional requirements and owners have been allowed a wide
attack upon such proceedings."' The existence of a statute making
a tax deed prima facie evidence of certain facts has not changed it
from providing only color of title and it is not sufficient to actually
pass title unless accompanied by the notice required by statute."8
9 Sherman v. Spalding, 126 Mich. 561, 85 N. W. 1129 (1901).
10 Keys v. Forrest, 90 Md. 132, 45 A. 22 (1899).
-Henderson, Mich. Stat. Anno. 1936, Vol. 6, §7.117.
12 Littlefield v. Petrisk, 250 Mich. 437, 230 N. W. 507 (1930).
it Sinclair v. Learned, 51 Mich. 335, 16 N. W. 672 (1883); Westbrook v. Miller,
64 Mich. 129, 30 N. W. 916 (1887).
14 Flack, Anno. Code of Md. 1939, Art. 81, § § 72-90.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § §719-52.
1 See note in 32 Ill. L. Rev. 953 at 957. In Garrett v. Wiggins, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.)
335 at 337 (1837), the court said: "It is a settled principle of the common law,
that a party, claiming title under a summary and extraordinary proceeding, must
show all the indispensable preliminaries to a valid sale, which the law has pre-
scribed, in order to give notice to those interested, and to guard against fraud,
have been complied with, or the conveyance will pass no title." In Altes v. Hinck-
ler, 36 Ill. 265 at 267 (1864), the court said the tax buyer "has no standing in a
court of equity-not because he has done anything at all censurable in purchasing
at a tax sale, but because, in making the purchase, he has paid what the court,
when asked to decree the title out of the former owner, can hardly regard as a
valuable consideration." A tax title, then, is a purely technical as contra-dis-
tinguished from a meritorious title, and depends for its validity upon a strict
compliance with the statute.
17 See Hacklander, Validity of Tax Titles in Illinois, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 119 (1939).
is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, §751. See also Glos v. Mulcahy, 210 Ill. 639, 71
N. E. 629 (1904).
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The holder of a tax deed cannot perfect his title without at least
paying all taxes levied for seven years after the issuance of the
deed and, if he permits the land to be forfeited or sold for taxes
legally assessed during that period, the original owner may obtain
a reconveyance by tendering the amount expended by the tax title
holder.'9
As the tax buyer in the instant case had not yet perfected an
absolute title but held one which was subject to redemption, it would
appear on the surface that the Appellate Court erred in allowing
the defendant to show that his landlord's title had been divested.
Certainly, had the case been tried on the merits and proof adduced
as to the question of the destruction of the lessor's title, an entirely
different result would seem inevitable. As the question arose on
admitted pleadings, however, the actual outcome of the instant case
would appear correct,'2 but too great reliance should not be placed
on the decision as precedent.
21
H. H. FLENTYE
TRUSTS-ESTABLISHMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF TRUST-WHETHER
BROKER WHO GUARANTEED SIGNATURE OF TRUSTEE ON TRANSFER OF
STOCK BELONGING TO TRUST Is LIABLE TO BENEFICIARIES FOR TRUS-
TEE'S CONVERSION THEREOF IN ABSENCE OF NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S IN-
TENTION TO CONVERT-In the recent case of Mudge v. Mitchell
Hutchins & Company, Inc.,' certain residuary legatees under a will
filed a bill for an accounting against the defendant brokerage firm
claiming an alleged conversion of certain shares of stock, endorse-
ment of which had been guaranteed by defendant. These shares at
one time belonged to the testatrix but had been transferred under a
trust agreement to her son as trustee and had been registered in his
name in that capacity. One condition of that agreement was that,
if the trust had not been revoked before the settlor's death, it should
then terminate. Soon after making this trust, the settlor executed a
second agreement with her son identical to the first except that she
named a different successor trustee, and all the property under the
first trust was included therein.2 Upon the death of the testatrix-
settlor, one of the beneficiaries named in the will raised the question
as to whether the trust res passed under the agreement or under
the will, so a suit for construction of the will was begun. Before
the court had an opportunity to pass thereon, the trustee, who was
19 II. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, §736.
20 It appears that no evidence was offered in the trial court, but that judgment
was pronounced as if on motion for summary judgment: 323 fll. App. 79 at 83,
55 N. E. (2d) 104 at 106.
21 As a general proposition, an action for forcible entry and detainer is a civil
remedy for possession and matters of title may not be inquired into: see Fortier
v. Ballance, 10 Ill. 41 (1848); Shulman v. Moser, 284 Ill. 134, 119 N. E. 936 (1918).
1322 Ill. App. 409, 54 N. E. (2d) 708 (1944). Leave to appeal has been denied.
2 The trustee did not change the registration of the stock certificates but re-
tained them in his nan Q- trustee under the earlier trust.
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also executor, transferred the shares to himself as an individual and
misappropriated the same. After the beneficiaries learned of the
misappropriation, this suit was begun on the theory that as the
defendant brokerage firm had assisted therein it was liable as a
converter. The "assistance rendered" was said to consist in guar-
anteeing the trustee's signature on the endorsement and forwarding
the stock certificate, together with a copy of the first trust agree-
ment certified by the trustee's attorneys, to the corporation upon its
demand for proof of a right to make the transfer 4 thereby deceiving
the corporation into believing that the trust was still in existence.
On a showing by defendant that it lacked knowledge of either the
death of the settlor, of the execution of the second trust agreement,
or of trustee's wrongful intent, the trial court dismissed the bill of
complaint. That decision was affirmed when the Appellate Court
for the First District declared that the guarantee by the defendant
was only that the signature of the trustee was a genuine one and
that the defendant's acts were not the cause of the loss.
Actions by a cestui or by a successor trustee against the corpo-
ration itself, for permitting the transfer and sale of stock held in
the name of a trustee, particularly following a misappropriation
of the proceeds by the latter, are not uncommon. The instant case,
however, is the first of its kind in Illinois involving the particular
question of the liability of the participating broker. The reason for
the paucity of precedent may well lie in the fact that, if the stock
has any value, the corporation is solvent and able to pay for the
damage caused while the financial status of the brokerage firm may
be unsound.5 Regardless of the practical aspects, however, a nice
legal question is presented for the practice of guaranteeing the sig-
nature in case of stock transfers has become so common that little
thought may be given to the legal effect thereof, yet it forms one
of the major points for consideration in the instant case.
Corporate stock transfer agents, unable to know the parties
involved in the many transactions they are required to handle and
aware of the consequences of accepting a forged transfer," have
come to insist upon evidence of the genuineness of the signature
to the assignment either by requiring attestation before a notary
public or the furnishing of a guarantee from some bank or broker-
age firm with whom such transfer agents customarily deal. Reli-
ance by the transfer agent on such guarantee is considered sufficient
to protect it in the transfer of stock provided the certificates are
-3jSuit in equity was necessary as the plaintiffs lacked the necessary legal title
to support an action as for trover: Ridge v. Giffrow, 220 Ill. App. 590 (1921).
4 Although the language quoted from the trust instrument did not expressly au-
thorize the trustee to hold shares in his own name, the court found a probable
acquiescence in that practice by the settlor as part of the plan of administration:
322 Ill. App. 409 at 413, 54 N. E. (2d) 708 at 709.
5 A similar suggestion as to transfer agents was made by Behrends and Elliott
in "Responsibilities and Liabilities of the Transfer Agent and Registrar," 4 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 203 at 218-19 (1931).
a Lake Superior Corp. v. Rebre, 65 Pa. Super. 379 (1917).
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otherwise properly endorsed and stamped.7 It is also well established
that the broker who guarantees such signature may be held liable
if the signature is a forgery,8 but not if the signature is genuine
even though the transfer instruments are otherwise forged.,
Such decisions would limit the guarantee to one of genuineness
only, but the case of Jennie Clarkson Home for Children V. Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Railway Company,10 suggests it possesses a broader
scope by adding the idea that it also covers a guarantee of capacity
to act. In that case, the broker had guaranteed the signature of a
corporate officer who had proved his authority to sign in such rep-
resentative capacity by offering forged instruments. When holding
the broker liable,1' the court said that "if the witnessing of the sig-
nature of the corporation is only that of the signature of a person
who signs for the corporation, then the guaranty is of no value." 12
In the light of that decision, there would seem to be a duty placed
on the broker making the guarantee to ascertain that the person
signing had authority to do so, which raises the question as to
whether or not the same rule should apply in cases of stock held
in trust, such as in the instant case, where the trustee desires to
transfer the stock into his individual name.
The trust agreement, in the instant case, gave no power to the
trustee to hold trust property in his own name and, without such
express authority, the law looks with disfavor upon that practice,"3
particularly since the trustee is bound to "comply strictly with the
directions contained in the trust instrument, defining the extent and
limits of his authority, and the nature of his powers and duties." 14
74 So. Cal. L. Rev. 203 at 217.
s Rosier v. General Gas & Electric Corporation, 255 N. Y. S. 342, 142 Misc. 596
(1932).
9 Appenzellar v. McCall, 270 N. Y. S. 748, 150 Misc. 897 (1934).
10 182 N. Y. 47, 74 N. E. 571, 70 L. R. A. 787 (1905).
" The facts indicate that the broker knew of the forgery so made a false guar-
antee. Liability on such proof would not be difficult to establish. See, for example,
Wilson v. Jones, (Tex. Civ. App.) 29 S. W. (2d) 845 (1930), reversed (Tex.
Comm'n of Appeals) 45 S. W. (2d) 572 (1932), where banker stated he knew
genuineness of signature and would guarantee same when in fact it was a forgery.
Held: banker's statement was more than a mere opinion, so liable regardless of
knowledge of truth or falsity thereof.
12182 N. Y. 47 at 65, 74 N. E. 571 at 576.
1 3White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897); In re Union Trust Co. of
New York, 149 N. Y. S. 324, 86 Misc. 392 (1914); Morris v. Wallace, 3 Pa. 319, 45
Am. Dec. 642 (1846); Norris's Appeal, 71 Pa. 106 (1872); In re Yost's Estate, 316
Pa. 463, 175 A. 383 (1934). In Christy and McLean, Jr., The Transfer of Stock
(Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1940), 2d Ed., §72, p. 130, the explanation is
given that "if stock belonging to the trust estate is registered in the individual
name of the trustee it destroys notice of the trust . .
14 See 2G R. C. L. p. 1372, §232. Restatement, Trusts, §179, states: "The trustee
is under a duty to the beneficiary to keep the trust property separate from his
indiviual property, and, so far as it is reasonable that he should do so, to keep it
separate from other property not subject to the trust and to see that the property
is designated as property of the trust." Subsection (e) of §179 also states: "In
the case of a formal trust, such as a trust created by will or deed of trust, min-
gling by the trustee of trust property with his own property is improper, unless
it is clearly permitted by the terms of the instrument."
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For that reason, it has been held that when a trustee takes stock in
his own name he becomes the insurer of the investment and com-
mits a technical breach of trust 15 which has been classed as a legal
fraud "without regard to the intention, or integrity of the trustee,
or the honesty and good faith of the particular transaction." 16
To prevent such practice, statutory provisions exist which forbid the
taking of trust property in the individual name of the trustee, 17
although Illinois has no such enactment. The import of these prin-
ciples, absent express authority in the trust instrument, would seem
to indicate that the trustee in the instant case lacked the capacity
to make the transfer he did and the defendant, if it guaranteed more
than the genuineness of the signature,' must have been certifying
that the trustee possessed broader powers than he actually had.
Undoubtedly, a bank or corporation which does any act to assist
the trustee in misappropriating trust property-with knowledge that
it is property of that character can be held liable for the loss, 9
and knowledge of circumstances which point to the necessity of
making further inquiry, but which inquiry is not made, will lead to
liability for any loss accruing from such negligence.2" Although
courts are not in agreement as to whether inquiry is necessary when
one holding securities in the style of "trustee" requests their trans-
fer,2' yet, if one is put on inquiry as to the powers of a trustee, sees
the trust agreement, and thereafter participates in the trustee's acts
thinking such acts are. within his powers when in fact they are not,
the person so acting cannot protect himself merely by the fact that
he has inquired as to the terms of the instrument. The improper
construing of a testamentary trust instrument should not protect the
one who improperly construes it. As was said in Manion v. Peoples
Bank of Johnstown," there "need not have been intentional wrong-
doing or collusion . . . One has notice of a breach of trust, not only
when he knows of the breach, but also when he should know it. ' '23
5 White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897).
- Morris v. Wallace, 3 Pa. 319 at 323, 45 Am. Dec. 642 at 643 (1846).
17 See, for example, Thompson's Laws of New York, 1939, Vol. II, p. 2015, being
§231 of the Surrogate's Court Act.
is The typical legend placed on the endorsement of a stock certificate reads
merely "Signature Guaranteed."
19 Duncan v. Jaudon and National City Bank v. Jaudon, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 165,
21 L. Ed. 142 (1872); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Cahn, 102 Md. 530, 62 A. 819
(1906); English v. McIntyre, 51 N. Y. S. 697 (1898); Bailie v. Sheldon, 189
N. Y. S. 749, 115 Misc. 441 (1921).
20 Geyser-Marion Gold Min. Co. v. Stark, 106 F. 558, 53 L. R. A. 684 (1901);
Leake v. Watson, 58 Conn. 332, 20 A. 343, 8 L. R. A. 666 (1890); Loring v. Salis-
bury Mills, 125 Mass. 138 (1878).
21 That inquiry is necessary, see Geyser-Marion Gold Min. Co. v. Stark, 106 F.
558, 53 L. R. A. 684 (1901). Cases holding inquiry is not necessary are Brewster
v. Sime, 42 Cal. 139 (1871); Titcomb v. Richter, 89 Conn. 226, 93 A. 526 (1915);
Albert v. Savings Bank, 2 Md. 159 (1852); Grafflin v. Robb, 84 Md. 451, 35 A.
971 (1896).
-238 N. Y. S. (2d) 484 (1942).
28 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 484 at 489.
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In this light, the defendant's failure to inquire as to the existence
of a possible second trust agreement or of the death of the settlor,
factors made iMportant by reason of language in the original agree-
ment which passed through its hands, should hardly be excused even
though it received nothing for the service rendered. The existence
of a different rule as to executors,24 can hardly justify change in the
law as to trusts and trustees for entirely different considerations
are involved in the two situations.
Perhaps the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, which has been adopted in
Illinois,2 5 was designed to overrule many of the decisions regarding
the duty to predetermine the authority of a trustee to sell or transfer
stock belonging to a trust. It does, at least, declare that the corpo-
ration or its transfer agent "is not bound to inquire whether the
fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in
making the transfer... and is liable ... only where .. . the transfer
is made with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a
breach of his obligation ... ." 26 But that statute would appear to be
designed to protect the corporation whose shares are the subject of
the transfer2 7 rather than to affect the obligation of one who as-
sumes to guarantee the genuineness of an endorsement or transfer
thereof. At any rate, such statute could not very well affect the
outcome of the instant case for it was not adopted until after the
bringing of this suit and is not retroactive in operation.28 It might,
however, prove of indirect significance in the event a similar situa-
tion to the instant case should arise in the future for if the corpora-
tion concerned cannot be held for a conversion of shares belonging
to a trust it is unlikely that it will bother to proceed against the
person who gives such guarantee. The beneficiaries suffering the
loss may have difficulty basing any action thereon,'9 but probably
will have no need to do so if they can show a conscious participation
in the conversion by the guarantor.
EDITH H. VAUGHAN.
241Bayard v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 52 Pa. St. 232 (1866).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 98, §234 et seq. Section 240 deals with the deposit of
funds by the fiduciary, while Section 236 concerns itself with the registration of
securities. It should be noted that Section 2 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §417, does not enlarge the powers of a trustee who
holds stock belonging to a trust.
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 98, §236.
27 According to the court in Stark v. National City Bank, 278 N. Y. 388 at 401,
16 N. E. (2d) 376 at 381, 123 A. L. R. 99 at 106 (1938), the purpose of the stat-
ute was "to expedite the transfer of securities-.. relieving trust estates from
delay .. ."
28 In 322 Ill. App. 409 at 426, 54 N. E. (2d) 708 at 715, the court noted that the
New York version of the statute was expressly declared not to apply to transac-
tions occurring prior to its adoptioi.
29 The third-party creditor beneficiary rule might not apply to such guarantees
on the theory that there was no intention to benefit such third person: Federal
Surety Co. v. Minneapolis Steel & Machinery Co., 17 F. (2d) 242 (1927).
